Abstract-The cyber threat landscape is a constantly morphing surface; the need for cyber defenders to develop and create proactive threat intelligence is on the rise, especially on critical infrastructure environments. It is commonly voiced that Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vulnerable to the same classes of threats as other networked computer systems. However, cyber defense in operational ICS is difficult, often introducing unacceptable risks of disruption to critical physical processes. This is exacerbated by the notion that hardware used in ICS is often expensive, making full-scale mock-up systems for testing and/or cyber defense impractical. New paradigms in cyber security have focused heavily on using deception to not only protect assets, but also gather insight into adversary motives and tools. Much of the work that we see in today's literature is focused on creating deception environments for traditional IT enterprise networks; however, leveraging our prior work in the domain, we explore the opportunities, challenges and feasibility of doing deception in ICS networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The threat landscape is changing significantly and constantly; complexity and rate of attacks is ever increasing, as network defenders lack the resources (people, technology, intelligence, context) to make informed decisions. The need for cyber defenders to develop and create proactive threat intelligence is on the rise, especially on critical infrastructure environments [1] . There has been a long linage of acknowledgment that Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vulnerable to the same classes of threats as other networked computer systems. Deception may provide analysts the ability to collect raw intelligence about threat actors as they reveal their Tools, Tactics, and Procedures (TTP). This increased understanding of the latest cyber-attacks would enable cyber defenders to better support and defend these critical networks, increasing the cost to the adversary by making it more difficult for them to achieve their objectives.
In practice, cyber defense in operational ICS is difficult -it often introduces an unacceptable risk of disruption to or delay Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract within the critical systems (e.g., power grids). The hardware used in ICS is often expensive, making full-scale mock-up systems for testing and/or defense impractical. Much of the work that we see in today's literature is focused on creating Deception Environments on traditional IT enterprise environments; however, leveraging our prior work in IT systems, we may explore the opportunity, challenges and feasibility of doing deception in ICS networks.
Such an environment would not only provide the means to identify and contain the threats in these operational networks, but would also facilitate the ability to study, understand, and develop protections against sophisticated adversaries. By leveraging actionable data, in real-time or after a sustained engagement, an ICS deception environment may be easily modified to interact with and change the perception of the adversary on-the-fly. This ability to change what and where the attacker is on the network, as well as change and modify the content of the adversary on exfiltration and infiltration, provides many benefits for an ICS Deception Environment.
However, it should be noted that ICS environments have immense difficulties in the creation of tools and techniques for security defense; new, novel techniques must be developed.
In this paper we discuss the development and deployment of flexible approaches to facilitate non-disruptive deception-based security solutions involving the integration of real, emulated, and simulated elements to model large, complex systems to include virtualization and Software Defined Networking (SDN).
In Section II we briefly cover aspects of cyber deception, followed by a look into the current approaches to cyber security in ICS networks (Section III). Next, we discuss the opportunities and considerations for deception in ICS through Sections IV and V. Using these underpinning as a foundation for deception, we then explore the applicability and feasibility of deception in these non-traditional, but highly vulnerable environments (Section VI) -finally drawing conclusions in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND: DECEPTION
Computer Network Defense (CND) has traditionally been provided using reactionary tools such as signature-based detectors, white or blacklisting, intrusion detection and protection systems, etc. While event detection and correlation techniques may identify threats those threats are then dealt with manually, often employing obstruction-based responses (e.g., blocking). As threat sophistication grows, we find these perimeter-planted security efforts ineffective in combating competent adversaries.
In 2016, Gartner identified deception as one of the top 10 technologies for information security. By 2018, Gartner predicts that 10 percent of enterprises will use deception tools and tactics, and actively participate in deception operations against attackers [2] . The global deception technology market is predicted to grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 10.3% over the next decade, to reach approximately $2.59 billion by 2025 [3] . Johns Hopkins University of Applied Physics Lab, which conducts research on Integrated Adaptive Cyber Defense for the Department of Homeland Security and the National Security Agency, expects the use of deception to expose adversary TTPs to be a key focus area moving forward [4] .
Deception technologies are defined by deceits and/or tricks designed to throw-off or thwart an attacker's cognitive processes, disrupt an attacker's automation tools, delay an attacker's activities or disrupt breach progression. For example, deception capabilities may create fake vulnerabilities, systems, shares or cookies. If an attacker tries to attack these fake resources, it is a strong indicator that an attack is in progress (as a legitimate user should not see or try to access these resources). The technologies to support cyber deception are emerging in the networking plane, applications, endpoints and the data itself, with more complex systems combining multiple techniques.
Today, the most commonly understood deception technique is the use of honeypots to understand adversary trends, explore botnet command and control networks, and collect malware and exploits for analysis that is, to collect early indicators of adverse actions, not necessarily to defend the organization. Researchers may speculate that deception defenses have not caught on as mainstream cyber defense as much as expected due to a handful of drawbacks: 1) Having fake IT resources on the network can confuse IT teams. 2) Legal teams may feel that active measures such as deception could be a potential liability. 3) For deception to be most effective, it needs to be customized and unique; this may require a significant workload which most organizations can't spare [5] . However, any of these drawbacks can be addressed through policy, training, and resource allocation. With advances in virtualization and software-defined-everything, the technologies to support deception are not the limiting factor. The need for cyber deception is evidenced by recent statistics. According to the Verizon 2016 Breach Investigations Report, only about 25% of compromises were discovered in"days or less," and the 2017 FireEye M-Trends report indicates that despite continuing improvement, the median number of days attackers dwell in victim networks before discovery is still 99 days, with 47% of breach notifications coming from external sources (such as the FBI) [6] . It is our belief that deception provides a method to deal with, contain and learn from sophisticated adversaries.
III. INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS AND CYBER SECURITY
The original SCADA systems were not built with the security mindset, but rather to aid in monitoring and control of physical systems. Since SCADA systems usually lack inherent security, they are appealing targets for cyber-attacks [8] ;
SCADA systems also include insecure subsystems, running unpatched, unsupported, unencrypted communications within their networks. Due to these factors, threats to SCADA systems and ICS have been on the rise. Cyber weapons such as Stuxnet [9] , BlackEnergy [10] [11] and Shamoon [12] [13] reveal how an already volatile and under-secured environment can be exploited and attacked.
It is often the case that SCADA networks are interconnected through a critical infrastructure provider's other networks, including those that are connected to the Internet. SCADA systems' diverse and geographically distributed locations require remote access capabilities; for that, the Internet is often used to provide that connectivity. Since these systems are often accessed remotely by a variety of different users including utility workers, multiple third-party vendors, among others, vetting and control of access may be cumbersome. One of the primary reasons for this level of access is to reduce costs. To create an entirely isolated SCADA network that was not connected in some fashion through a geographically disperse location would require an exorbitant number of single-purpose infrastructures (consisting of networking, tools, and equipment) to access and maintain the system. As a consequence, these Internetconnected devices that control and monitor critical physical processes are at risk of disruption by cyber-initiated attacks, and provide additional paths through which further attacks may be carried out.
Cybersecurity challenges are also complicated by the highly complex, interconnected networks of ICS that use generationally different physical equipment and applications rather than traditional commodity enterprise applications and infrastructure that undergo constant evaluation, patching, and refreshing. Another challenge is the lack of tools intended to help a system owner/operator better understand how their security posture can be used to create exploits. These exploits for ICS infrastructures may then be released for profit and further expose the vulnerable security state of ICSs. Finally, SCADA systems have evolved to include standard PCs, operating systems, and networking devices. It is often the case that these devices become "locked in time," operating in their original instantiations without updated cybersecurity features or patched vulnerabilities.
IV. OPPORTUNITIES
Recent changes in the computing environment, such as the rise of virtualization and software defined networking (SDN), make this an ideal time to change the defense paradigm. The gap between virtual and real infrastructure is closing; corporations are moving toward highly virtualized environments with SDN for day-to-day operations, also in ICS [7] .
One manufacturer of SDN-based solutions for ICS is Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL) [14] . SEL's SDN switches and controllers have been touted to provide the programmability of operational technology (OT) SDN networks, thereby paving the way for the development of new cybersecurity methods and controls to improve network performance and protection. They have partnered with Veracity, an Industrial Networks provider, and prepared a white paper which details the areas these firms are working in the Department of Energy's "Project Chess Master." Chess Master is a key area of in the program "Continual and Autonomous Reduction of Cyber Attack Surface for Energy Delivery Control Systems." [15] Another DOE project to address cybersecurity in ICS is the Artificial Diversity and Defense Security project (ADDSec) [16] . The ADDSec project is meant to develop solutions to introduce unpredictability and enhance situational awareness to energy delivery control systems, protecting them against cyber-attack. The project heavily leverages SDN and machine learning to introduce randomness into control system networks and extend solutions from the local network area to the WAN.
The ubiquity of this environment change is a new opportunity that the network defender can leverage. In ICS networks, it is never truer that predictability in the ICS environment is foundational to an adversary's success. ICS networks are often ingrained, hard-coded and/or static in nature, and thusly, change infrequently due to the prohibitive cost of modification, fielding, retrofitting, etc. However, we can exploit the adversary's expectation of a homogeneous, fixed environment to the defense's advantage by leveraging contemporary trends with the use of virtualization and SDN technologies, and thereby:
• Enable the detection and identification of anomalous access and intrusions; • Adjust to the dynamic nature of adversaries by livemigrating them into deception environments of highfidelity; and • Provide mechanisms to discover and react to the adversary's attacks in a methodical and proactive manner. These technologies allow network defenders to gather information on the adversary's tools, tactics and procedures (TTPs) through introspection at the network and endpoint layers. They also provide the ability to modify the environment on-the-fly, such as host attributes, files and the network itself, to further entice, redirect, or isolate the network attacker.
V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR ICS-DECEPTION
Leveraging prior work in Enterprise Deception: we build on, compare and contrast the ability to both simultaneously run Enterprise and ICS Deception Environments. Deceptive enterprises, or IT networks, have interesting problems with regard to heterogeneity, fidelity and dynamism; ICS networks also pose unique challenges as well. In the subsections that follow, several considerations (and distinctions from IT) are discussed with the aim of creating ICS-Deception.
A. Enterprise vs ICS
The functional difference between IT and ICS networks is not the only feature that separates these networks. The authors of [17] outline ten areas of difference between ICS and IT security; these areas not only highlight security differences, but also provide a blueprint to what ICS deception might include (see Table I ). These differences not only aid in understanding why the security state of ICS is the way it is, but also help drive some of the considerations that follow.
B. Emulating Field Devices
One tenet of creating a deception environment is to generate a deception that faithfully represents the target. The path to virtualization in enterprise networks is becoming well paved: full-scale virtualization of servers and workstations, containerization of services, and abstraction of the network through SDN. Enterprise workloads are often based around the processing and transport of data, with little ties to physical processes. This underlay of factors lend themselves well to crafting deception environments. OT networks, on the other hand, are heavily dependent on the physical domain; producing emulations of interactions with the complex physical world are quite intensive. However, the simplicity and deterministic nature of ICS devices lend themselves well to being cast as black box devices.
C. Communication Protocols
Deceptions based on IT networks have an advantage with years of research in virtualization. This results in an ease of generating network traffic that "looks" like it should, through exercising virtual machines with mouse-keyboardplayback capabilities, or traffic generators. The communication protocols are secondary to traffic generation as they have been normal parts of the networks for decades, whether clear-text or encrypted. ICS protocols are tied to physical processes, and have normally remained in the physical domain. Emulation of these protocols, whether wrapped in TCP or transmitted "on the wire" must be carefully crafted to promote fidelity. Although communications may be predictable, minutia in such things like readings may indicate deception if using playback or low-fidelity emulation of processes. Furthermore, the type of protocol may be directly related to the field device -hence, the two must be considered when attempting to create a ICS deception.
D. Multiple Deception Networks
With the rise of IT-based business networks and the need for remote access to OT, multiple touch points now exists between what was once islanded ICS networks and external networks. Thus, when generating a ICS deception, one must consider network chains from the ICS network out. To support attackers who may breach through one vector, then begin pivot through the OT and IT networks, deceivers must create many Relevant Intelligence deception environments that look and feel like the operational network (using real network configurations), with emulated services and interactions with the "outside" world; environments that can be configured programmatically through a standard Application Programming Interface (API), both from the hosts (hosts, services, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, routes, dynamic name service (DNS), etc.) or from the network (routing protocols, VLANs, etc.). Whether generating fullscale or hybrid deception networks, the stitching between the false and real components must conform to the normal artifacts of authentic networks.
E. Application Programming Interfaces
It may be necessary to integrate several different components together to create a framework to specify, deploy, monitor and change deception environments. With this in mind, deception should not be approached as a single, onetime deployment solution. A natural feedback from the end of a deception employment should be used to then reiterate the process from the specification phase again. Thus, at and in between each phase, a defender should have the ability to interface with the environment seamlessly. Hence, a unified API should be used to simplify the process. The same unified interface should be used to deploy the environment, manage an SDN controller, reroutes flows, migrate virtual machines or containers, extract and correlate information, and change the environment on-the-fly, in real-time as required.
F. Relevant Intelligence
As the deception networks are crafted, and as they continue to engage, the need for relevant intelligence is utmost importance. When instantiating the deceptions, attention must be given to the description of the network and its devices based on current threat trends, attach methodologies, "in the wild" vulnerabilities and known exploits, and predicted areas of interest based on local or geopolitical conditions. Furthermore, as information is extracted from the environments, proper assessment of attacks, attribution, TTPs should be conducted with due diligence to produce intelligence for the defender community that is concise, accurate and actionable.
G. Defender Stealth
In IT networks, defensive tools are apparent in several different facets of the network, and can thus exist in ITbased deception networks without much ado. Commercialoff-the-shelf security solution and agents collect data from endpoints and pass them along to aggregators and SIEMs. In an ICS network, such agents and systems would not normally present themselves on endpoint systems (consider embedded OSes such as Windows XP). Thus, the defender/deceiver must have a tool that allows them to maintain stealth in an otherwise "unprotected" network. Through virtualization, the hypervisor provides a stealthy path to extract information from the endpoint with introducing artifacts associated with embedded agents or monitoring planes.
H. Transparent Modification
When emulations of devices and systems have been drawn up in the deception environment, it is necessary that a mechanism exist to modify the state of the device as needed. Reasons for doing so include changing devices based on attacker interest, fixing devices that may have been attacked, updating device parameters, or exercising the devices themselves. The mechanism to produce these changes should be transparent to the device or endpoint, as revealing such may destroy the deception. Often, out-of-band management systems have been used to simulate or emulate virtual ICS systems; however, the existence of such a network is a tell. Like Defender Stealth, approaches like hypervisor introspection provide convenient ways to inject/extract information from devices in a transparent fashion.
I. Lived-in Feel
All devices found in IT or ICS networks have some type of fingerprint. Such fingerprints in IT-based assets show themselves readily all the way from the architecture of operating systems, to the ways the systems are configured, to the data on the systems themselves. Although edge devices in ICS may lack conventional operating system characteristics and features, firmware and logic may attest to the device's fingerprint. Furthermore, workstations in an ICS, such a engineering or maintenance workstation that might include configurations, schematics, software, human-machine-interfaces and historian software, must be crafted to provide the necessary historical elements, as well as the "lived-in" feel associated with time on-line, accounts, roles, data and accesses. Tools designed for transparent modification may be leveraged to produce lived-in environments.
J. Logging and Analysis
As with all networks that require in-depth visibility and analysis, logging is paramount. Logs should be captured to express the state-of-health of the network and its devices, communications links, transactions, normal and abnormal behaviors or alarms, and metadata to describe with greater granularity and attribute the generated logs. Enterprise networks have grown over the years to have such logging features included. IT-based infrastructure in ICS networks may be able to generate such logging, but the endpoints in these networks lack the resource to support generating additional streams of context for out-of-band assessment tool-chains. With this consideration, behavioral analysis of the data itself might need to be observed. Thus, logging must be able to parse and decipher and understand raw data of the network, without introducing affects that might impact performance requirements. Although the environment may be a deception, and would not directly affect a live process, constraints must still be met to promote believability of the network.
K. Modularity and Flexibility
Regarding the deception framework and network deployed: neither should be considered final. As mentioned, the framework that produces the deception network would be comprised of several components. Those components should be integrated through common application interfaces that provide for the modularity of the system itself, such that removing components will not disable the system, upgrading components will no introjected downtime or reactors, and introducing new components will be seamless and not adversely impact current components. Furthermore, the deployed deception should also be based on flexibility. Architectural components like virtualization, SDN, and Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) provide the means to modify the environment with little to no impact; however, automation tools may also provide value in identifying and crafting additions to the environment based on defender or machine-driven observations.
VI. CREATING AN ICS-DECEPTION
The idea of a deception-based ICS has been explored both in academia [18] [19] and industry [20] [21] [22] . Sandia carries a long lineage of research into modeling and simulation, emulation/emulytics, deception and ICS security. Leveraging past work in those respective fields [23] , along with the considerations addressed in the previous sections, the authors of this paper applied their deception methodology [24] to creating a deception environment for an ICS; the incorporation of novel techniques and methodologies previously used for IT/Enterprise/Cloud network deception is what separates this work from previous efforts. The following subsections describe creating the model of a representative ICS environment, generating the network emulation, then deploying that emulation.
A. Modeling a Deception-based ICS
To demonstrate the cyber deception methodology applied to an OT network, a model of a SCADA system was created that included modeled Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). These devices provided a direct interface to control and monitor equipment and sensors. An IED, e.g., a protective relay, may communicate directly to the SCADA Server. Or a local Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) may poll the IED to collect the data and pass it to the SCADA Server.
The modeled or virtualized SCADA system also included a Human-Machine Interface (HMI), SCADA server, and other components to manage the overall system. The typical communication between the control center and the remotely located devices was via a wide area network (WAN). The SCADA control center included a LAN that provided network connectivity to the various devices in the control center; through an SDN fabric these communication links promote flexible. Additional connections linked the control center network to the business network. In most configurations, connections between the control center network and business corporate network are protected by a network firewall, or a "pivot" point for flowmigration purposes.
Modeling protocols that enable communication in the control system network are integral to cyber deception. The virtualized deception framework supports many protocols, including ModbusTCP, Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3), International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 60870, and IEC 61850 (GOOSE messaging). As new standards of communication for SCADA protocols appear, modular methodology can include new protocols.
IEDs may be polled directly and controlled by the SCADA server or remote terminal units (RTUs). In some cases, there are local configurations and functionality that allow the IED to act independently of the SCADA control center. IED control by the SCADA server requires that ModbusTCP, DNP3, and IEC 60870 packets be transported over the networks that provide connectivity. Through flow redirection, packet/session crafting, and endpoint cloning/ instantiation, attacks may be redirected and/or contained in deception enclaves or environ-ments to carry on the engagement and extract intelligence and TTPs.
B. Deployment and Preliminary Observations
In this section we discuss anecdotal results from running several live experiments. In the experiments, we allocated public-IP space to deception environments that consisted of both IT and OT devices emulations, with innocuous naming conventions. With the IT devices, we deployed services with inherent vulnerabilities (e.g. weak/default passwords, known vulnerable services) to understand and determine how and what Internet-based attackers were attracted to. Preliminary results suggest that much of the traffic that relates to ICSrelated services and devices (e.g., RTUs and FEPs running ModBus) have some general characteristics:
• Unauthorized users port scanning the devices.
• Commercial scanning services (e.g., Shodan), attempting connections to devices.
• Unauthorized users to the system who did not scan for ICS protocols did not interact with it.
• Users who exploited IT-centric services, e.g. SSH, only went as far to connect and explore filesystem(s). Although we are still conducting experiments and honing the environments, we are able to note some observations. Tools for interacting with IT services are more ubiquitous and usable, thus are used more readily. We postulate that the entry barrier for understanding ICS is significantly higher than that of IT. It is not as simple to attempt to flip a service off, as it is to log into an SSH server. Consequently, there's not immediate feedback nor a trivial way for unsophisticated attackers to affect change in the system. The amount of system-and process control-level understanding needed to attack SCADA/ICS systems would require a significant amount of time and effort. While untrained attackers try to pursue these networks, they lack the skills and resources to effectively execute attack; resultant data speaks to this notion. Well-resourced actors know who they target, and are well-equipped to do so.
Thus, we propose extensions to better understand ICSadversaries through deception. Organizations (e.g., utilities) should create deception systems and leverage their existing IPspace; sophisticated threat actors target victims, not scan for them. With this, emulated device fidelity is a must, to include hardware-in-the-loop for further realism and touchpoints to authentic network infrastructure -but should also include the ability to isolate and migrate attacks as needed.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Many IT practitioners are turning to deception-based techniques to protect their networks and learn about their adversaries. Translating the same technology to an ICS environment has several challenges, but is not infeasible. However, it is not enough to be technologically feasibility, environment considerations must be addressed. ICS threat actors are sophisticated and know their targets beforehand. To derive actionable intelligence from a realistic ICS-deception -location and identification are paramount.
